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INTRODUCTION 
Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995 and became 
immediately subject to the European legal system with European laws 
superimposed over its national system.1 This Article will explore how 
Finnish judges have adapted to Finland’s membership in the European 
Union. There has been a fair amount of scholarly attention to how being 
part of the EU has changed politics and government in Finland,2 but there 
has been very little attention in the last twenty years to how joining the 
  
 * J.D., Ph.D. Professor of Political Science and Director of the Law & Society 
Program at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. During the 2014–15 academic 
year, he served as the Fulbright Distinguished Bicentennial Chair in American Studies for 
the North American Studies Program at the University of Helsinki in Finland. 
1  1.  ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 46 (2004).  
 2. See TAPIO RAUNIO & TEIJA TIILIKAINEN, FINLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
38–39 (2003). See also DAVID KIRBY, A CONCISE HISTORY OF FINLAND 279–84 (2006); 
Jaakko Nousiainen, The Finnish System of Government: From a Mixed Constitution to 
Parliamentarism, in THE CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND 21–22, 37–38 (2001). 
496 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.2  
 
EU has affected Finland’s judges and courts.3 In fact, one of the best 
works to examine Finland and the European Union barely mentions 
Finland’s judiciary.4 This is not totally surprising, since the Finnish 
courts often work in almost complete obscurity. In fact, there is very 
little written in English about Finnish judges and law, and this article will 
attempt to reduce somewhat that gap in our knowledge and 
understanding.  
This Article brings an American judicial politics analysis to the 
question of how Finnish judges have adapted to Finland’s membership in 
the European Union. As I have noted in a previous work, “[t]he term 
judicial politics assumes that judges in the United States are both legal 
and political actors at the same time, making their decisions in part based 
on legal reasoning and legal analysis and in part based on ideology and 
other political factors.”5 Americans and Europeans often have a very 
different approach to studying law and courts. As one judicial politics 
scholar has noted,  
Whereas European legal scholars speak of law as a logically coherent 
set of authoritative principles and rules, American legal scholars often 
speak of law as a manifestation of the ongoing struggle among groups 
and classes for political and economic advantage, or as a manipulable 
set of tools for achieving better government.6  
As part of my American perspective, I treat the courts as political (as 
opposed to partisan) institutions. Many socio-legal and judicial politics 
scholars, especially Americans, see the courts simultaneously as both 
legal and political institutions.7 As one comparative judicial politics 
  
 3. But see Tuomas Ojanen, The Impact of EU Membership on Finnish 
Constitutional Law, 10 EUR. PUB. L. 531, 531–64 (2004).  
 4. The only reference to European law and courts is a statement that “the 
decisions of the EU are enforceable by the European Commission and the EU court 
system.” RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 1. 
 5. MARK C. MILLER, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2015). 
 6. Robert A. Kagan, American Courts and the Policy Dialogue: The Role of 
Adversarial Legalism, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 
13, 32 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004). 
 7. MILLER, supra note 5, at 3.  
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scholar has argued, “[e]very judicial decision is a choice among 
competing values. . . . In every case some societal value is favored over 
another, and the essence of politics consists in authoritatively allocating 
values for society.”8  
This Article will also use an institutional analysis to examine the 
relationship between Finnish courts and the European legal system. This 
new institutionalist approach to judicial politics seeks to understand how 
the nature of judicial institutions constrains the political choices of the 
judges who compose them.9 As one comparative judicial politics scholar 
has noted, “[i]nstitutions and organizations give structure to the social 
world. They provide logics and opportunities for action, but they also 
constrain it, through certifying actors, fixing roles and expectations, and 
authorizing certain forms of activity, while prohibiting others.”10 The 
new institutionalist analysis will also allow us to utilize various levels of 
analysis: from a single judge being the lowest level of analysis, to a 
specific court, to the two supreme courts in Finland, to the entire Finnish 
judiciary being the highest level of analysis. Since new institutionalist 
analysis also includes role theory, the judicial role will also be examined 
in the Finnish context.11 Examining the courts through a new 
institutionalist lens will, therefore, help us better understand how Finnish 
courts and judges have adapted to EU membership in their role as part of 
the national judiciary of Finland. I was fortunate enough to live and teach 
in Helsinki, Finland during the 2014-15 academic year. This Article is 
based in part on scholarly works about Finnish courts and law available 
in English, as well as interviews I conducted in English with judges, 
academics, and practitioners in Finland and elsewhere in Europe.12 
  
 8. Mary L. Volcansek, Appointing Judges The European Way, 34 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 363, 363 (2007). 
 9. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence: The New Institutionalism 
and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 89–108 (1988); see generally 
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. 
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). 
 10. STONE SWEET, supra note 1, at 5. 
 11. Role theory is a very important part of the new institutionalist analysis of 
courts and judges. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 191–92.  
 12. Throughout this Article I will use quotations and paraphrases of comments 
made during my interviews. I promised all of my interviewees that the interviews would 
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I. FINLAND AND ITS EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 
Joining the EU in 1995 greatly strengthened Finland’s ties to other 
Western European countries to its west and south, although it can never 
forget about the very long border in the east with its former ruler, the 
Russian Federation, which controlled Finland from 1809 until 
independence in 1917.13 Before being ruled by the Russian Empire, 
Finland was ruled for more than 700 years by its western neighbor, the 
Kingdom of Sweden.14 Finland never became a province of Russia 
proper, but instead existed as an autonomous Grand Duchy within the 
Russian Empire.15 Under Russian rule, the Finns were able to maintain 
most of the Swedish legal system and the previously enforced Swedish 
laws.16 In some important ways, the Russian Czar functioned as the 
constitutional monarch of the Grand Duchy,17 although at times the 
autocratic emperors attempted mercilessly to subjugate the determined 
Finns.18  
For the most part, Finnish judges were able to maintain the 
independence of the judiciary during Russian rule, thus giving Finland a 
  
remain anonymous, so there are no references to names or specific titles of the 
interviewees for this research project. I had lengthy interviews with two key judges on 
the Supreme Court of Finland; one key judge serving on the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Finland; two staff members and a judge on the ECJ in Luxembourg; three 
prominent law professors at the University of Helsinki; two lawyer practitioners who 
argued European law cases before the courts of Finland; and several Ph.D. candidates in 
law at the University of Helsinki, the University of Turku, and Åbo Akademi University 
in Turku, Finland. I thank all of them for taking so much time to talk to me and for their 
patience with an American trying to understand the Finnish judicial culture. 
 13. RICHARD D. LEWIS, FINLAND, CULTURAL LONE WOLF 28 (2005). 
 14. Id. at 25–28. 
 15. Id. at 28–29. 
 16. The Swedish code of 1734, the Swedish Constitution Act of 1772 and the Act 
of Security and Union of 1789 generally remained in effect in Finland during the period 
of Russian rule when Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire. 
Yrjö Blomstedt, A Historical Background of the Finnish Legal System, in THE FINNISH 
LEGAL SYSTEM 8, 32 (Jaakko Uotila ed., Leena Lehto trans., 1985). 
 17. Markku Suksi, Finland, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 87, 88 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011). 
 18. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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separate and more Western legal and general political culture.19 Finland 
declared its independence from Russia during the chaos of World War I 
and the Russian Revolution but lost about 10% of its territory to the 
Soviet Union at the end of World War II.20 After military losses to the 
Soviet Union in World War II and despite its neutral stance during the 
Cold War, Finland was always afraid of offending its powerful eastern 
neighbor.21  
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland was often thought of 
as a fiercely independent and neutral buffer state between Europe to the 
west and Russia to the east,22 but few foreigners seemed to understand 
that its legal system was clearly European in style and focus. While 
during the Cold War the Finns had to accommodate Soviet preferences in 
their foreign and security policies,23 the Finnish legal system nonetheless 
shared a great many similarities with its Nordic neighbors to the west.24 
“German legal thinking” played a key role in the development of the 
Finnish legal culture,25 as well as did Swedish and Danish legal thinkers. 
Thus, the Finnish legal tradition has always been seen as part of a larger 
European legal culture; law professors, courts, judges, and lawyers have 
always looked to the west for inspiration and assistance. As one scholar 
has noted, “[f]or centuries continental legal thinking has influenced and 
  
 19. OUTI KORHONEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
LAWYER’S STANCE TOWARDS CULTURE, HISTORY AND COMMUNITY 102–03 (2000). 
 20. See, e.g., MATTI KLINGE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF FINLAND 119, 122 (3rd ed., 
2000).  
 21. See KIRBY, supra note 2, at 276–78. 
 22. LEWIS, supra note 13, at 31–32. As another commentator has observed, 
“Finland has historically been on the frontier between Western and Eastern Europe, 
between the Swedish Empire and the Russian Empire, and between the Catholic and later 
the Protestant Western Church and the Orthodox Eastern Church. Today it is an 
independent, modern Nordic Welfare State.” TERTTU LENEY, CULTURE SMART! – 
FINLAND 8 (2005). 
 23. See RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 11. A common term used for this 
situation during the Cold War era was “Finlandization.” 
 24. See, e.g., Jaakko Husa, Precedent in Finland – Paradigm in Transition, in 
FINNISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT 7, 7–23 (Erkki J. Hollo ed., 2006). 
 25. Id. at 10. 
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inspired Finnish lawyers to develop a legal system suitable for North 
European conditions and practices.”26  
For geopolitical reasons, Finland probably could not have joined the 
European Union until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but after the 
breakup of the U.S.S.R., Finland quickly sought to align itself more 
formally with Europe.27 As a former prime minister of Finland has 
argued, “[b]y joining the Union Finland took her place in the new Europe 
emerging from Cold War division.”28 For many legal professionals in 
Finland, having the country join the European Union seemed like a 
natural course of events.29 However, Finnish judges, lawyers, and law 
professors had almost no knowledge of the European legal system and 
European laws before becoming part of the EU.30 In my interviews for 
this project, almost all of my interviewees described joining the 
European Union as a shock to the Finnish legal culture.31 However, this 
shock has received very little scholarly analysis.  
II. BECOMING FORMALLY EUROPEAN BRINGS CHANGES TO FINLAND 
There is no question that Finland’s membership in the European 
Union has in some ways greatly transformed Finnish politics and 
government.32 Finland is now clearly a part of Europe, socially, 
  
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. See RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 11. 
 28. Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, Forward to TAPIO RAUNIO & TEIJA 
TIILIKAINEN, FINLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ix, ix (2003).  
 29. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 30. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 31. For example, Husa describes Finland’s membership in the EU as having a 
revolutionary effect on Finnish law and legal culture. Husa, supra note 24, at 15.  
 32. Some see the current era of EU membership as a defining period in Finnish 
history. As one commentator has noted, “[f]ollowing the Swedish period, the Russian 
period, and the 20th-century republic, a new era in Finnish history is beginning to take 
shape: that of the European Union.” KLINGE, supra note 20, at 171. Other scholars have 
written that, “[t]he significance of EU membership for Finland should not be 
underestimated.” RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 11. Another scholar notes that 
membership in the EU has been key to Finland’s “process of wholesale re-identification 
on the international stage.” David Arter, Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case 
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politically, and legally.33 While still technically neutral in international 
affairs and refusing for the moment to become a formal member of 
NATO,34 nevertheless, Finland’s membership in the European Union has 
required that Finland cooperate much more with its friends in Europe; 
thus cementing Finland’s status within Europe.35 As a former Finnish 
prime minister has noted,  
The accession of Finland to the European Union in 1995 was a logical 
and decisive step in Finland’s long-standing policy of participation in 
European integration. . . . Membership in the Union has strengthened 
Finland’s international position and it is fair to say that it is now 
stronger than ever before.36  
But Finland’s membership in the EU has not come without costs and 
some frustration. One of the biggest changes to Finnish government and 
politics arising from EU membership was the fact that Finland had to 
reform and consolidate its constitution in part to accommodate its new 
position in the European family of nations.37 
Thus, Finland’s new Constitution of 2000 came about in large part 
because of the need to reform political and governmental practices and 
structures in order to meet the demands of EU membership.38 In addition, 
the new Constitution is also a natural consolidation and reform of the 
  
of Finland’s Northern Dimension Initiative, 38 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 677, 691 
(2000). 
 33. As two Finnish scholars have noted, “Finland has often been characterized as 
a ‘model student’ of the EU that is always willing to promote common goals and to 
respect common rules and obligations.” RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 149. 
 34. Nevertheless, Finland often cooperates closely with NATO even though it is 
not a formal member of the organization. Christoph Hasselbach, Finland’s Cautious 
Relationship with NATO, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 17, 2015),  
http://www.dw.com/en/finlands-cautious-relationship-with-nato/a-18390701.  
 35. See RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 150. “Finland’s national 
European policy can be characterized as flexible and constructive, and it has sought to 
consolidate Finland’s position in the inner core of the EU.” Id. 
 36. Id. at ix (quoting Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen). 
 37. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 38. See Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 21; SCANDINAVIAN LAW: DANISH LAW, 
FINNISH LAW, NORWEGIAN LAW, SWEDISH LAW, RIGHT OF RETURN, DISTRICT COURT, 
DRUG POLICY OF SWEDEN 94 (2010). 
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previously fragmented constitutional documents39 used in Finland since 
its independence from Russia in 1917.40 Contrasting the new Constitution 
with previous practice, Professor of Public Law Markku Suksi has 
observed, “[t]he Constitution of Finland . . . , in force since 1 March 
2000, is now a single coherent text that is consistent and modern.”41 In 
some ways, the new Constitution illustrates the dramatic changes that 
have resulted from Finland’s joining the EU, including the weakening of 
the powers of the President of Finland in favor of strengthening the 
powers of the Prime Minister and the Government.42 Before the 
enactment of the Constitution of 2000, the President had almost total 
control over Finland’s foreign policy and security issues in what was 
called a semi-presidential governmental system, but now that 
responsibility mainly rests with the Prime Minister, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and the Government.43 Since 2000, the President looks 
more like a traditional European head of state instead of the singularly 
  
 39. As Suksi explains,  
The piecemeal amendments made to the Finnish Constitution, that is, to 
the four constitutional documents, during independence had caused the 
Finnish Constitution to look like a patchwork of provisions. The text of 
the Constitution had lost its consistency and it was difficult for an 
ordinary person to extract from the Constitution the different procedures 
regulated therein. 
Markku Suksi, The People as the Advisor: The Referendum in Finland, in FINNISH LEGAL 
SYSTEM AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT 177, 190 (Erkki J. Hollo ed., 2006). 
 40. See Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 22–23. 
 41. Suksi, supra note 17, at 88.  
 42. Here I am using the term “Government” in its British sense, which generally 
means the political party in power, which appoints the various Ministers in Government 
or the Council of Ministers. This is different from the American usage of the term 
“government,” which usually means the broader governmental system instead of the 
party in power. Finland generally follows British usage in this regard. In Finland, which 
almost never has a single majority party in parliament, the term “Government” usually 
means the parties that have formed a coalition agreement and the Ministers from those 
parties. The head of Government is of course the Prime Minister. At times the term 
“Government” in Finland refers to the ruling coalition parties and at times it means 
simply the Council of Ministers. When “Government” in Finland is capitalized, they are 
using the British sense of the word; when in lower case, they mean the American usage 
of the term. This Article will follow that convention.  
 43. See generally Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 37. 
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powerful foreign policy leader of the nation. The Prime Minister and the 
other Ministers of the Government now solely represent Finland in EU 
discussions among member states. The President retains the power to 
appoint most high officials in Finland, but now almost always follows 
the preferences of the Prime Minister in these appointments.44 The 
President has also retained power in the Constitution as the acting 
supreme commander of Finland’s military,45 but all presidential decisions 
in this regard must now occur in cooperation with the relevant Minister.46 
Thus, Finland’s membership in the European Union has resulted in the 
transformation of Finland from a unique semi-presidential governmental 
system to a full parliamentary system that “under the new Constitution[,] 
. . . will not be that much different from the other parliamentary republics 
in Europe.”47  
The new Constitution of 2000 also gives the courts a limited power of 
post-enactment judicial review. Following the Swedish model, Finland 
has no separate constitutional court.48 The practice has been for the 
Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament to decide questions of 
constitutionality before legislation is enacted.49 Under the new 
Constitution of 2000, however, the courts have been given a limited right 
to exercise the power of judicial review (in its American sense of the 
term) after legislative enactment.50 The Constitution requires that all 
courts give primacy to the Constitution, and all judges must utilize the 
Constitution as the highest source of law in the nation.51 Under prior 
  
 44. KIRBY, supra note 2, at 283. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 32. 
 47. Id. at 33. 
 48. Ojanen, supra note 3, at 532. 
 49. Id. As Ojanen notes, “[a]lthough the Committee is an organ of Parliament 
and, accordingly, is composed of MPs, its practice is characterized by a search for 
constitutionally well-founded interpretations and consistent use of precedents.” Id. 
 50. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 51. The Judicial System of Finland, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FINLAND (May 6, 
2013), http://www.oikeusministerio.fi/en/index/theministry/thejudicalsystemoffinland. 
html. According to information from the Ministry of Justice,  
No constitutional court exists in Finland, but the courts and other 
authorities are under an obligation to interpret legislation in such a way as 
to adhere to the Constitution and to respect human rights. According to 
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constitutional practice, the courts followed the British model of 
parliamentary supremacy, and there was no thought at all of judges using 
judicial review in the American sense.52 As one scholar has noted about 
the new constitutional judicial review language,  
[T]he aim of the provision was not to give the courts carte blanche to 
assess or generally look into the constitutionality of legislation. The 
primary control of constitutionality, in the future as in the past, is the 
advance evaluation done by [Parliament’s] Constitutional Law 
Committee during the progress of the bill through Parliament.53  
It remains to be seen whether Finnish courts will exercise their new 
post enactment power of judicial review. Since joining the European 
Union, in theory, the national courts also have the power to declare 
national legislation void if it is in conflict with European law.54 Today, 
the courts in Finland do have a limited power of judicial review based on 
both the national Constitution and based on European law, but few 
expect that Finnish judges will use this new authority very often if at 
all.55  
Another dramatic change that EU membership brought about is the 
fact that Finland is now subject to European law, with Finnish judges 
needing to incorporate the decisions of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg56 into their decision-making processes.57 As noted above, the 
  
the Constitution, the courts should give preference to the Constitution 
when they decide a case if the application of an act would be in manifest 
conflict with the Constitution.  
Id. 
 52. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 53. Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 32. 
 54. “ECJ rulings can enhance the power of national courts in their own legal 
system vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches by providing the opportunity for 
review of national legislation” to make sure it is in line with European law and ECJ 
decisions. RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: 
LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 167 (2007). 
 55. See Suksi, supra note 17, at 97. 
 56. Although Finland and the other Nordic countries were among the first nations 
to sign the European Convention on Human Rights, they did not incorporate the decisions 
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new Constitution requires judges to interpret legislation to promote 
human rights, and therefore Finnish judges must interpret the case law of 
both of these courts in that effort.58 This need to interpret European law 
came about very rapidly in Finland, and almost all of my interviewees 
noted that lawyers, judges, and law professors had very little preparation 
or understanding of European law before Finland joined the EU in 
1995.59 As one of the judges whom I interviewed told me, the European 
legal system was almost fully formed when Finland entered the EU, and 
thus Finland was subject to European law immediately.60 This abrupt 
adjustment to European practices was typical for the new member-
states.61 As two scholars have noted about Finland and other fairly recent 
members of the EU, “[t]he newcomers had to adapt to the challenges 
posed by EU membership very quickly, almost overnight, unlike older 
member states whose adaptation has been incremental and has occurred 
over several decades.”62 This Article will focus on how Finnish judges 
and courts have adapted to this new European law regime, which came 
as a shock to the Finnish legal system.  
Thus, Finland’s membership in the European Union coupled with its 
new Constitution has brought about great changes in Finnish politics and 
society. One of the biggest results for our purposes has been the fact that 
the courts are more important than ever in Finland. The Finnish courts 
  
of the European Court of Human Rights into their national laws until the early 1990’s. 
GIUSEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE’S LEGAL 
SYSTEMS: JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND THE CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL LAWS 44 (2012).  
 57. After the Lisbon Treaty took effect in 2009, the European Union became a 
direct signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, making the decisions of 
both the ECJ in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
important sources of law for the national judges in the EU member states to consider. 
Paolo Carrozza, Foreword to GIUSEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE NATIONAL 
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE ECHR AND EU LAWS 3, 3 (2010). 
 58. See supra pp. 497-99. 
 59. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 60. Sankari further elaborates on this point when she writes, “[f]or most of the 
present Member States the fruits of the work of the first period [1960–1990] Court of 
Justice formed part of the acquis communautaire they accepted on entering the EU.” 
SUVI SANKARI, EUROPEAN COURT LEGAL REASONING IN CONTEXT 44 (2013). 
 61. See RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 3. 
 62. RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 3. 
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have applied both European law and the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights into their daily decisions, and in theory, they have the 
power to overturn national legislation if it conflicts with the national 
Constitution or with European law. This has led two scholars to conclude 
that the Finnish courts and Finnish judges have been empowered by 
European integration and attention to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.63 As Tuomas Ojanen observed,  
Thanks to the EU, even some of the fundamental tenets of the 
Constitution, such as the principle of sovereignty and the separation of 
powers between Parliament, the Government and the President, have 
undergone—and are undergoing—transformations. Similarly, EU 
membership has increased the importance of the judiciary (judicial 
empowerment), led to reforms of parliamentary and administrative 
practices, and focused attention on the relationship between EU law 
and the domestic system of constitutional rights.64 
III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN FINLAND 
In order to begin to get an understanding of how courts and judges 
actually function in Finland, we should briefly examine the history of the 
nation in more detail than we did at the beginning of this Article. Recall 
that for about 700 years Sweden ruled the territory now known as 
Finland, until the Russians took over following the Russian military 
victory over the Kingdom of Sweden in 1809.65 From 1809 until 1917, 
Finland existed as an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire.66 
Under Swedish rule, the elites spoke Swedish (or perhaps German) while 
the working classes spoke Finnish.67 This language division persisted 
under Russian rule, and very few people in Finland spoke Russian even 
during the Grand Duchy period.68 Therefore, even under Russian rule 
there were Finnish speaking Finns and a Swedish speaking minority in 
  
 63. MARTINICO & POLLICINO, supra note 56, at 102. 
 64. Ojanen, supra note 3, at 531. 
 65. See supra pp. 490-92. 
 66. See supra pp. 490-92. 
 67. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 68. See HENRIK MEINANDER, A HISTORY OF FINLAND 108–09 (2011). 
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the country. Under Swedish rule, Finland adopted the basic features of 
the Swedish approach to law, and in the Grand Duchy, the Russians for 
the most part allowed the Finns to retain the Swedish court system, 
Swedish laws, and the Swedish and Finnish languages.69 Swedish 
remained the language of the law in Finland, even during the Russian 
period.70 During Russian rule, Finland had its own legislature and its own 
central administration in addition to its own legal system.71  
Nevertheless, the overall political position of the Grand Duchy of 
Finland under Russian rule was very fragile, and the Finnish bureaucracy 
strictly controlled almost all aspects of Finnish social and political life in 
order to prevent the Russians from having an excuse to curtail Finland’s 
political autonomy.72 Somewhat surprisingly, the Russians gave most of 
the top bureaucratic positions to Finnish nobles in order to assure their 
loyalty to Russia.73 Under Swedish rule, most Finnish nobles followed a 
military career, but under Russian rule it was much safer for the nobility 
to become members of the legal profession instead.74 Thus, under 
Russian rule, most of the top bureaucrats in the country and most of the 
members of the Finnish Senate were lawyers educated at the only 
university in Finland at the time, the University of Helsinki.75 Thus, all 
lawyers gained a very high status in Finland during this era because the 
legal profession was dominated by the nobility.  
Finnish lawyers and bureaucrats adopted a highly formalistic and 
legalistic approach, in large part to protect the political autonomy of the 
Grand Duchy. As Esa Konttinen explains,  
Emphasis on law was a means for top bureaucrats to secure the 
autonomy of the country. Attempts by Russia to reduce the internal 
autonomy of Finland were repelled by appealing to strict legal 
  
 69. See Blomstedt, supra note 16, at 26. 
 70. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 71. Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 8. 
 72. Esa Konttinen, ‘Finland’s Route’ of Professionalization and Lawyer-
Officials, in LAWYERS & VAMPIRES: CULTURAL HISTORIES OF LEGAL PROFESSIONS 101, 
103 (W. Wesley Pue & David Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 73. Id. at 106. 
 74. Id. at 106–07. 
 75. See id. at 104, 106–07, 112. 
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procedures. But this was possible only as long as this emphasis on 
lawfulness was successfully communicated to Finnish citizens as 
well.76  
Finland’s independence in 1917 was made much easier by the fact 
that so many structures of the administrative state, including the courts 
and the legal profession, were already in place and staffed by Finns, not 
Russians.77 After independence from Russia, the legal profession retained 
its prestige in Finland as evidenced by the fact that throughout its history 
most of the Presidents of the Republic have been lawyers.78 In fact, in 
one of my interviews I was reminded that the first President of the 
Supreme Administrative Court in Finland eventually went on to become 
President of the Republic.79  
The Finnish legal system has therefore been greatly influenced by 
Sweden and its other Nordic siblings,80 but very little by Russian 
practices or legal theory. One of the judges whom I interviewed stated 
that the Russian legal system today is so different from the one in 
Finland that Finnish judges have almost no knowledge of it.81 Finland is 
one the Nordic nations, and Finland has often shared common statutes 
  
 76. Id. at 109. 
 77. Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 8. 
 78. Konttinen, supra note 72, at 109.  
 79. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 80. The Finns generally consider themselves to be Nordic, but not Scandinavian. 
See generally LEWIS, supra note 13, at 113–14. Scandinavia is considered to be Sweden, 
Denmark, and Norway. See id. at 114. The Nordic countries add Iceland and Finland to 
the three Scandinavian nations. See id. This may be due to language, since Finnish is not 
a Scandinavian tongue (unlike Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian). Id. Many foreigners 
use the words Nordic and Scandinavian as synonyms, but the Finns tend to make a clear 
distinction between these two terms. See id. 
 81. There is also a language barrier for Finnish judges. Hannele Branch, Where 
Does Finnish Come From?, THIS IS FINLAND, http://finland.fi/public/default.aspx? 
contentid=160056 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015). The Finnish language is not at all related to 
Russian, but it is also not related to Swedish or the other Scandinavian languages even 
though it uses the western alphabet. See id. Finnish is related to Estonian and the Sami 
languages spoken by the indigenous peoples in Finland, and quite distantly related to 
Hungarian. See id. Despite the fact that Finland shares a border with Russia, few 
educated Finns speak Russian today. See id. 
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and legal approaches with its Nordic neighbors, especially Sweden.82 
Finland formally joined the Nordic Council in 1955, at the same time 
that it joined the United Nations,83 but informal cooperation among the 
Nordic nations had been going on for decades (and with Sweden 
specifically for centuries) before that.84 The Nordic countries share a 
similar approach to law and legal culture, although there are some clear 
differences among these five nations and their respective semi-
autonomous territories like Greenland and the Faroe Islands.85 
The Nordic legal cultures have components of both the common law 
and civil law families of legal systems. Some commentators consider the 
Nordic countries to be a separate legal tradition while others consider 
them a subset of the civil law tradition.86 The Nordic countries tend to 
bring a pragmatic approach to law and legal issues. One of the law 
professors whom I interviewed observed that Nordic legal systems do not 
have a unified civil code, and thus Nordic judges are accustomed to 
consulting and using multiple sources of law like their common law 
colleagues.87 This has made it easier for Finish judges to use the case law 
of the ECJ and of the European Court of Human Rights because they 
were accustomed to using multiple sources of law before Finland joined 
the EU. Because of the lack of a comprehensive civil code, private law in 
Finland by its nature is “practical and concrete, not theoretical and 
abstract.”88 However, judges in the Nordic family of nations tend to 
approach their role in a way that is very similar to judges in civil law 
countries, meaning that they see law as a science,89 making Nordic law 
  
 82. Blomstedt, supra note 16, at 38.  
 83. RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 11. 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 85. Husa, supra note 24, at 7. 
 86. Id. 
 87. The Constitution of 2000 is the highest source of law within Finland. Id. at 
11. Statutes and the Constitution are the primary sources of law, and if a judge were to 
disregard them they would be guilty of a serious misconduct in office. Id. at 12. Lower 
judges must also follow the precedents of higher courts as another important source of 
law. Id. But customary law might also be followed in some cases. Id. at 14. Other less 
traditional sources of law in Finland include human rights based in international treaties 
and ECHR decisions, and EU law. Id.  
 88. Id. at 8. 
 89. MARK C. MILLER, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 6–7 (2015). 
510 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.2  
 
very close to the civil law tradition in that respect. As one of my 
interviewees told me, the written opinions of the supreme courts in 
Finland, for example, read much more like succinct civil law decisions 
rather than the lengthy analysis of the facts and the law that appear in the 
opinions written by common law judges.90 The role of the judge is more 
restricted and defined in the Nordic countries unlike in the common law 
world, but Finnish judges do follow the concept of precedent from higher 
courts similar to the way it works in common law countries.91 In some 
ways, Nordic legal traditions are halfway between the common law 
world and the civil law world, although Finland is somewhat closer to 
the civil law world than the other Nordic countries because of its 
historical affinity for German legal thinking.92 One litigator who has 
worked in both the United Kingdom and in Finland told me about the 
differences between lawyering in the two countries, “[i]n the common 
law world, law is one of the tools in my toolbox. In the civil law world, 
the law is the rulebook.”93 Given Finland’s history, it is not surprising 
that Finnish judges continue to look to their Swedish and other Nordic 
colleagues for examples of how to solve various legal questions.94  
Swedish was of course the language of the law and of administration 
under Swedish rule for centuries (and even under Russian rule for 
another century), and the transition to using Finnish as well for these 
purposes was quite gradual.95 Swedish and Finnish are now the two 
official languages of Finland, and the Constitution and various statutes 
strongly protect the rights of the Swedish-speaking minority.96 Today 
  
 90. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 91. Husa, supra note 24, at 7–9. 
 92. Id. at 10. 
 93. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 94. As one scholar has noted, in Finland “[t]he Nordic concept of self-
government and rule of law as an ideal form[ ] a historical basis that continues to have an 
influence even today.” Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 7. 
 95. Virpi Koivu & Heikki E.S. Mattila, Interpretation of Multilingual Texts in 
Finland, in FINNISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT 24, 26 (Erkki J. Hollo 
ed., 2006).  
 96. KIRBY, supra note 2, at 184–87 (2006). The Constitution also specifically 
protects the Sami languages spoken among Finland’s indigenous peoples, the Roma 
language spoken by a tiny minority in Finland, and sign language spoken by the deaf in 
Finland.  
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about 93% of Finns are Finnish speaking and about 5.5% are Swedish 
speaking.97 Today the courts use both languages, and Finnish speaking 
lawyers and judges often become quite comfortable reading Swedish. 
One of the main reasons that Swedish is still important for legal 
professionals in Finland today is that scholars and judges continue to rely 
so heavily on legal interpretation materials (statutes, cases, and 
commentaries) from Sweden, as well as early Finnish legal sources 
written solely in Swedish. As two scholars further elaborate on this point, 
“Swedish cases have been of particular interest. Sometimes, the Supreme 
Court has made use of a Swedish precedent to such an extent that even 
the statement of reasons for the decision has been directly taken from this 
precedent.”98 In addition to using legal materials from Sweden, Finnish 
judges on occasion will also borrow ideas and legal reasoning from their 
other Nordic colleagues as well.  
Today Finland continues to follow the Swedish model of courts, with 
two supreme courts and no constitutional court. As has been mentioned 
earlier, the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament serves the 
function of a constitutional court present in many European countries.99 
The regular courts and the administrative courts have very different rules 
and procedures,100 and several of my interviewees mentioned that judges 
on the administrative courts tend to be more academic and more 
cosmopolitan in their worldviews. The regular court system handles both 
civil and criminal cases. There are numerous local District Courts with 
tenured professional judges (and sometimes additional lay judges also sit 
in on some criminal cases), six Courts of Appeals are scattered 
throughout the country, and the Supreme Court of Finland sits at the top 
of the judicial pyramid for the regular courts.101 The eight regional 
Administrative Courts hear administrative law cases, with the Supreme 
Administrative Court being at the top of that system.102 The Supreme 
  
 97. LENEY, supra note 22, at 11. 
 98. Koivu & Mattila, supra note 95, at 28. 
 99. See discussion supra, p. 10. 
 100. HENRIIKKA ROSTI ET AL., LEGAL AID AND LEGAL SERVICES IN FINLAND 4 
(2008). 
 101. See Ojanen, supra note 3, at 557–58. 
 102. Id. 
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Administrative Court handles about 3500-4500 cases per year, and some 
estimate that about a third of these cases today involve European law 
issues.103 As in Sweden, there are also specialized courts, such as the 
High Court of Impeachment, the Market Court, the Labor Court, the 
Insurance Court, and the Prison Court.104 Both the Supreme Court of 
Finland and the Supreme Administrative Court have supervisory 
responsibilities over the lower courts within their jurisdictions.105 The 
decisions of both supreme courts have the status of precedent that should 
be followed by lower court judges courts in their respective court 
systems.  
All professional judges in Finland are technically appointed by the 
President of the Republic on the advice of the Prime Minister and the 
Government for tenured terms until the mandatory retirement age of 
sixty-five.106 At some point in the future, a special nominations board 
may be created to handle judicial selection issues.107 Thus, the 
Constitution requires that permanent judges have their jobs protected and 
even cannot be transferred to another position without their permission, 
because Finland highly values judicial independence.108 During my 
interviews, however, justices on the Supreme Court told me that 
applicants for seats on the Supreme Court apply directly to the Court 
itself, and the justices themselves determine which applicant is the best 
qualified.109 Then the President of the Supreme Court forwards the 
Court’s choice to the President of the Republic, who then automatically 
appoints that person to the Supreme Court.110 It appears that the Prime 
Minister and the Government play no role in the judicial selection 
process, as least at the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative 
  
 103. Id. 
 104. Anne E. Niemi, The Civil, Criminal and Disciplinary Liability of Judges, in 
FINNISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT 113, 113 (Erkki J. Hollo ed., 2006). 
 105. Mikael Hiden, The Constitution, in THE FINNISH LEGAL SYSTEM 39, 55 
(Jaakko Uotila ed., Leena Lehto trans., 1985).  
 106. Nousiainen, supra note 2, at 39.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Niemi, supra note 104, at 114. 
 109. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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Court level. It seems that the justices are in fact choosing their own new 
colleagues.  
A country’s legal culture certainly reflects its general political 
culture.111 Like many of their Nordic neighbors, Finland has a strong rule 
abiding culture based on honesty, trust, consensus, and self-rule. As one 
scholar noted, “Finland has a very strong legalist tradition.”112 For judges 
and for the general public in Finland, law is “strongly binding and 
unconditional or obligatory.”113 Even today Finns pride themselves on 
being a very law-abiding and legalistic society where honesty is a prized 
value. Almost all of my interviewees mentioned this fact. Recall that 
some of this comes from the Russian era, when legalism served as the 
main defense against Russian domination.114 This law-abiding and rule 
following culture also prizes honesty and trustworthiness. As one 
commentator has explained, “Finland has been ranked for many years, in 
international comparisons, as the least corrupt country in the world.”115 
The so-called Protestant work ethic is also deeply ingrained in Finland.116 
Thus, Finland is almost always at the top of the world’s Corruption Free 
Index.117 As almost all of my interviewees explained, Finland is a society 
that assumes that everyone is doing the right thing and that honesty is 
highly valued.118 This “trust society” concept is deeply rooted in the 
Finnish psyche. After World War II, Finland paid off its enormous war 
reparations to the Soviet Union in record time.119 Finns pay their debts 
very quickly, and Finland is one of the fastest payers in the EU.120 This 
rule following and law-abiding nation has very little patience for 
  
 111. Sabine Frerichs, Constitutional Ideal Types in the Global Age: A Sociological 
Review, in THE MANY CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE 70 (Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 
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 112. Liisa Nieminen, The Emergence of a European Constitutional Law, in 
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 113. Husa, supra note 24, at 11. 
 114. Suksi, supra note 17, at 90. 
 115. LENEY, supra note 22, at 64. 
 116. Id. at 92. 
 117. LEWIS, supra note 13, at 3.  
 118. As one commentator has written, “Finnish honesty is of the blue-eyed, 
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 119. KIRBY, supra note 2, at 240.  
 120. LEWIS, supra note 13, at 3.  
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individuals or even countries that do not follow the rules.121 In fact, 
Finland is so law abiding that it still follows the Swedish tradition and 
mostly allows questions of constitutionality of legislation to be 
determined by the Parliament itself, because it is assumed that the 
Members of Parliament will always approach their decisions in an honest 
and non-partisan fashion!122 Although trust, honesty and legalism are 
very important to Finns, Finnish judges also bring a strong sense of 
pragmatism to their work.123 Some commentators even argue that the 
hallmarks of the Finnish governmental system are pragmatism and 
adaptability.124 Finnish culture clearly values pragmatism over 
ideology,125 and this is true in the legal system as well. 
Although Finnish legal culture clearly values pragmatism, which 
gives Finnish judges some flexibility in specific cases, this does not 
mean that the judges see their work as political in any way.126 Finnish 
judges separate respect for the rule of law on the one hand, and politics 
(partisanship) on the other, in part because of Finnish history. During 
Russian rule, Finnish judges were often imprisoned when Russian 
citizens living in Finland, and Russian corporations doing business in 
Finland, disapproved of their rulings.127 This occurred with some 
frequency in the 1909-1917 period.128 The Finnish judges used a more 
  
 121. For example, Finland has been highly critical of how Greece has handled its 
financial crisis. According to one news report, “[i]n the five years since Greece’s 
financial woes were revealed to the world, it has been sleepy Finland which has emerged 
as the most trenchant critic of EU largesse to the indebted Mediterranean.” Mehreen 
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 122. Ojanen, supra note 3, at 531–32. 
 123. Id. at 561.  
 124. RAUNIO & TIILIKAINEN, supra note 2, at 149. 
 125. LEWIS, supra note 13, at 32.  
 126. For Americans, judges can be political without being partisan, but it takes 
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 127. See KORHONEN, supra note 19, at 105. 
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Western notion of legal rules as important and inviolable, while the 
Russians wanted relaxed procedures to make their business dealings 
easier.129 Thus, the Russians wanted the judges to be political, but the 
Finns felt that political and partisan decision-making would destroy the 
rule of law. Thus, in Finnish political discourse, “the preferred party is 
seen as one upholding the rule of law which has been corrupted by 
politics on the other side.”130 Finish judges today do not participate in 
political debates in Finnish society, and by tradition Finnish judges 
almost never make any public statements, as my interviewees told me. 
Finnish society is less rigidly bureaucratic than in some other European 
nations. Therefore, the pragmatic judges apply legal rules honestly and 
fairly without letting the rules qua rules be the only point of 
consideration in judicial decision-making.  
The historical notion of the separation of law and politics in Finland 
was further reinforced by the country’s experiences during and 
immediately following its Civil War in 1918. After declaring its 
independence, Finnish society quickly split into leftist, working class and 
pro-Russian “Reds” and conservative, middle class and pro-
independence “Whites.”131 The two sides fought a Civil War in 1918, 
supported in part by Russian military assistance on the Red side and 
German soldiers on the White side.132 The Whites quickly won a military 
victory under the leadership of General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, who is 
a national hero in Finland.133 The Whites argued in their propaganda that 
they represented the law-abiding segment of Finnish society, while the 
Reds were outlaws and revolutionaries.134 As one scholar explains, “[t]he 
White Government did not recognize the Reds as a competing regime, a 
belligerent party or as insurgents, but treated them merely as criminals 
and traitors.”135 When the Whites won the Civil War, they brought swift 
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punishment against the Reds. This scholar continues, “[t]he Whites had 
the deep conviction that their government was the legitimate government 
of Finland: that they had the law on their side and, as a result, the right to 
punish the rebels.”136 The reality, however, was not so clear-cut about 
which side was the most law-abiding. There was a great deal of extra-
legal retribution during and after the Civil War on both sides, including 
by the Whites who had argued that only they could uphold the rule of 
law in Finland.137 After the Civil War ended, the victorious leaders of the 
Whites decided to put all Red prisoners on trial for treason, and the 
judges merely rubberstamped the sentences dictated to them by the 
White military commanders.138 Several of my interviewees noted with 
shame how Finnish judges violated the rule of law with their harsh 
sentences for the defeated Reds.139 Nevertheless, the narrative of the 
victorious Whites was that they won the Civil War because they 
followed the rules and protected Finland’s law-abiding political culture. 
Thus, even today being seen as law-abiding is critical to Finland’s 
political identity. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE NATIONAL COURTS 
The ECJ has helped create a new system of European law, which 
Cichowski says is based on the “treaty provisions, secondary legislation, 
ECJ precedent and the procedures that govern rulemaking” in the EU.140 
The ECJ, sitting in Luxembourg City, is the top court in the European 
Union’s legal system.141 The ECJ currently has twenty eight judges, one 
  
 136. Id. at 18. 
 137. Immi Tallgren, The Finnish War-Responsibility Trial in 1945-46: The Limits 
of Ad Hoc Justice?, in THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 430, 443 (Kevin 
Jon Heller & Gerry Simpson eds., 2013).  
 138. Hannikainen, supra note 134, at 24.  
 139. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 140. CICHOWSKI, supra note 54, at 4. 
 141. After the Lisbon Treaty went into force in 2009, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union became the official name of the European Union system of courts, made 
up of three separate courts: the ECJ, the General Court (formerly known as the Court of 
First Instance), and the specialized Civil Service Tribunal. See SANKARI, supra note 60, at 
 
2016] Finnish Judges and the European Union 517 
 
from each of the member states of the EU, and nine Advocates 
General.142 One of the judges on the ECJ told me that having a judge 
from each of the member states on the Court greatly facilitates the 
judges’ understanding of the unique judicial culture in each nation. It 
also encourages the dialogues between the national judges and the judges 
on the ECJ. Although the European Union includes both common law 
and civil law societies, the traditional practice of the ECJ has been to 
follow the French (civil law) model in the style of its written opinions,143 
meaning that its opinions are often terse and highly abstract.144  
Over the years, decision-making on the ECJ has received a great deal 
of scholarly attention, both from those who conceptualize the EU 
primarily as an international organization similar to the United Nations145 
and from those who instead conceptualize the EU more as a federalist 
supranational quasi-polity.146 What is clear to both camps is that the ECJ 
has taken the lead in promoting both the legal and the political 
integration of the European Union. The Court has done this by 
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establishing a system of European law that the member-states have 
agreed to follow. As one scholar argues,  
Without a body of law that can be uniformly interpreted and applied 
throughout the EU, the Union would have no authority, and its 
decisions and policies would be arbitrary and [inconsistent.] By 
working to build such a body of law, the Court of Justice—perhaps the 
most purely supranational of the major EU institutions—has been a key 
player in promoting integration.147  
In the process, the ECJ has certainly increased its own standing and 
prestige. As one scholar has thus proclaimed, “[t]he European Court of 
Justice . . . is the most powerful and influential supranational court in 
world history.”148 
The increase in the prestige and power of the ECJ is of course part of 
the global trend of the increasing importance of courts in their respective 
systems of government.149 According to one scholar, “[International] 
court constitutional review jurisdiction mirrors the growth of judicial 
review powers across domestic political systems” after WWII.150 Courts 
are becoming more active, and critical issues in many societies are now 
handled by the judiciary today. Alter reminds us that the world is 
changing around us. She states,  
The growing role of judges, both domestic and international, is self-
evident. In the United States and Europe courts review most major 
policy initiatives, and judicial rulings are front-page news. . . . 
International courts are part of this global trend and a powerful symbol 
that law and legalism have become part of foreign affairs and 
international politics.151  
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When Finland entered the European Union in 1995, most of the key 
tools that the ECJ uses to promote European integration were already 
well established152: the direct effect doctrine and the doctrine of the 
supremacy or primacy of European law.153 The direct effects doctrine 
states that European law is directly and uniformly applicable in all 
member states,154 meaning that European law has a “direct effect” in 
domestic law, thus becoming part of the national law of each member-
state without any further independent action.155 The ECJ pronounced this 
doctrine in the 1963 Van Gen den Loos case.156 The concept of the 
supremacy of European law means European law is superior to national 
laws and perhaps even national constitutions in areas of the law where 
the EU has responsibility,157 and conflicting national laws must therefore 
yield to European law in those instances. The ECJ first established this 
doctrine in 1964 in the Flaminio Costa v. ENEL case.158  
Both of these doctrines are implemented by the national courts, and 
the national courts are expected to send preliminary reference cases to 
the European courts when questions arise about how European law 
should be interpreted.159 In a preliminary reference case, the ECJ will 
interpret EU law, but not decide the outcome of the specific case before 
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it.160 That result is left to the national courts to implement after the ECJ 
provides its interpretation of what European law requires.161 As one 
scholar has explained, “[w]hereas in other actions the Court of Justice—
or more generally the [Court of Justice of the European Union]—decides 
the case by applying EU law, the Court’s preliminary rulings provide 
(legally binding) assistance to the national court that posed the question 
and that will apply the answer in deciding a case before it.”162 Weiler has 
argued that giving the national judges the ability to implement European 
law has given them more power, i.e. a form of judicial review, which has 
enhanced their own standing, thus making them loyal to the ECJ.163 
Burley and Mattli look at specific rhetorical devices in ECJ opinions that 
appear calculated to appeal to the national judges, thus increasing the 
bargaining position of the national judges.164 Nyikos found that in 
preliminary references national judges often signal to the ECJ the answer 
they hope to obtain (38% of the time) and this practice has increased 
over time and among heavy users of the reference cases.165 In a majority 
of cases where the national judges have signaled their preferred results, 
the ECJ has provided it.166  
In addition to the preliminary reference cases brought to the ECJ by 
national judges, individuals, corporations, a member state, or an EU 
institution can also bring a case directly to the European court system 
under certain circumstances.167 Cichowski among others argues that the 
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy coupled with the practice of 
preliminary reference cases have greatly increased the power of national 
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judges and of individual litigants including interest groups as well.168 
Goldstein points out that judicial empowerment means more in the 
European context than in the American context because almost all 
national judges in Europe are civil service employees without any real 
power or hope of career advancement.169  
The ECJ has often been called an extremely activist court.170 Its 
activism was most evident in the early period, from about 1960-1990, 
when its decisions had the effect of consolidating European 
integration.171 Some have even argued that during the early period 
various influential judges on the ECJ used “an intentional strategy to 
promote integration through law.”172 In the second period, after about 
1990, the ECJ has focused less on “questions fundamental to the legal 
order” and thus is somewhat less activist.173 Most of the criticism of the 
ECJ has been based on its activism in the early period. Some worry that 
the ECJ was making law, instead of just interpreting law. According to 
one scholar, “[t]his criticism against judge-made law, of courts playing 
politics instead of practi[c]ing law, is familiar to all. In EU law, such 
action has most often been discussed as (negative) judicial activism.”174 
Others have applauded the judicial activism of the ECJ, because it led to 
the political and legal integration of Europe.175 According to one scholar, 
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“[t]he European Court of Justice . . . today is one of the main motors of 
governance in Europe. It has turned a relatively young body of law into a 
dynamic and coherent legal system governing and protecting public 
interests and civil society.”176  
One of the key elements in this judicial activism is the fact that that 
the ECJ has constitutionalized the various treaties that form the 
foundation of the European Union and European law. As Martin Shapiro 
argued in 1992,  
The Marbury v. Madison of the European Court is not the 
establishment of review, but the movement of the review of member-
state acts from the sphere of international law to that of constitutional 
law. The Court has declared that through their treaties the member 
states have surrendered some of the sovereignty to the Community. The 
treaties, therefore, are not simply agreements under international law 
but create a constitutional regime.177  
During this constitutionalization process, the ECJ looked to the 
treaties and other sources of law to find the general principles of 
European law, but it has also looked to constitutional principles in the 
“shared heritage” of the national legal systems of the EU.178 In this way, 
the Court created an integrated system of European law, increased its 
own power, and also increased the power of the national judiciaries.  
Although still controversial among some European scholars,179 some 
commentators argue that the ECJ today is looking more and more like 
the U.S. Supreme Court sitting atop a federalist legal system. For 
example, Kelemen observes that both the structure of the EU’s 
institutions and the control these institutions exert over member states 
closely resemble the American federal system, with its separation of 
powers, large number of veto points, and highly detailed, judicially 
  
 176. CICHOWSKI, supra note 54, at 242. 
 177. Shapiro, supra note 155, at 126. 
 178. ALICIA HINAREJOS, JUDICIAL CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: REFORMING 
JURISDICTION IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PILLAR 183 (2009). 
 179. See e.g., de Witte, supra note 145, at 19–56.  
2016] Finnish Judges and the European Union 523 
 
enforceable legislation.180 Both Joseph Weiler181 and Jo Shaw have 
argued that the relationship between European law and national law 
“demonstrates the hallmarks of a federal system.”182 The ECJ has used an 
incrementalist approach to making policy, often using the precedent of 
its own decisions to justify policy change.183 This approach is also similar 
to the American experience.184 Hinarejos goes so far as to describe the 
EU legal system specifically as a federalist system, and refers to the ECJ 
as “federal constitutional court of sorts,” with the power to declare 
legislation unconstitutional.185 This scholar also observes that, 
“constitutional courts tend to empower the central level of government 
while federal systems are still young.”186  
Certainly one could argue that the ECJ’s decisions usually uphold EU 
interests and not the interests of member-states.187 The ECJ often 
constitutionalized European law without the consent of the Governments 
of the member-states, but with the assistance of the national 
judiciaries.188 As Cichowski explains,  
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[T]he ECJ functions to provide greater clarity to EU law and in doing 
so often expands EU competence while diminishing member state 
control over EU policy outcomes. . . . [T]he policy positions of member 
state governments do not systematically shape ECJ decision-making. 
Time and time again, the ECJ is clearly informed of the preferences of 
powerful member state governments, and the ECJ does not hesitate to 
act in opposition to these interests.189  
There seems to be little that the Governments of the member states 
can do to reverse this process.190 As several authors have explained, 
“national courts now apply the decisions of the ECJ even when national 
politicians and administrators object.”191 Even critics of the activism on 
the EJC now acknowledge that the Court has become a constitutional 
court of European law. As one critic of the Court has written, even if 
somewhat reluctantly, “[t]he Court of Justice is the constitutional court 
of the legal order and its methods of interpretation generally follow those 
universally shared by courts and, in particular, those that constitutional 
courts regularly employ.”192  
Because individual litigants can bring cases directly to the ECJ, or 
indirectly through the national courts and their preliminary reference 
procedures, this process has greatly increased the ability of individual 
litigants and interest groups to influence European law.193 Interest groups 
often use litigation as a strategy for bringing about political change.194 
Cichowski argues that interest groups were instrumental in helping bring 
about European integration because, “[t]he emergence and evolution of 
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supranational governance in Europe can be characterized by a complex 
relationship between social actors, organizations, and institutions.”195 
Interest groups also played a key role in the integration of Europe, in part 
because “market integration and the construction of the legal system 
have been mutually reinforcing processes.”196 Maduro argues that the 
ECJ was successful because it sought out and found support among 
various national actors, including interest groups, other litigants, and the 
national courts, in large part because of these actors’ domestic political 
needs.197 
Judges on the national courts have played a key role in the ECJ’s 
efforts at legal integration, and there has been a great deal of scholarly 
attention to the institutional dialogues198 between the justices of the ECJ 
and the judges sitting on the national courts.199 Stone Sweet observes that 
the legal system of the EU was not preordained in the treaties, but 
evolved due to the needs of litigants, national judges, and the institutions 
of the EU.200 According to this scholar,  
The Member States did not design the legal system that ultimately 
emerged. Legal elites (lawyers activated by their clients, and judges 
activated by lawyers) had to figure out how to use European law, to 
make it work in their interests. . . . Hardly passive, national judiciaries 
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negotiated their relationship to the European Court of Justice within a 
set of multidimensional, intrajudicial, “constitutional dialogues.”201  
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN EUROPE 
It is well settled that national statutes must conform to European law, 
but the position of national constitutions within the hierarchy of 
European law is less clear.202 In 2003, a new Constitutional Treaty was 
proposed for the European Union, which would have given the EU a 
single constitutional document and a single legal identity, rather than 
being the collection of a variety of legal communities with multiple 
identities.203 The proposed Constitution Act (sometimes called the 
Constitutional Treaty) included a clear statement that European law 
would be supreme throughout the European Union, similar to the 
Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution. The proposal failed when 
voters in France and the Netherland rejected the new treaty in national 
referenda in 2005.204 The defeat was a blow to many European 
federalists. But others saw many positives for the EJC in this event. 
Some have even argued that the failure of the Constitution Treaty has 
increased the bargaining power of the ECJ in their dialogues with the 
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national judiciaries.205 As two scholars explain, “[t]he absence of a 
supremacy clause …. has permitted the ECJ over the years to devise and 
reshape the content of the primacy principle, giving it an incredible 
flexibility.”206 
After the defeat of the Constitution Treaty, a new proposal known as 
the Lisbon Treaty was written in 2007, and it came into force throughout 
Europe in 2009. Most of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty (about 90%) 
are the same as the Constitutional Treaty that did not go into effect,207 but 
the new Lisbon Treaty does make some changes. For example, although 
the ECJ continues to have one judge per member state serving renewable 
six year terms, under the Lisbon Treaty the appointees must now be 
approved by a new seven person committee composed of former EJC 
judges, members of national supreme courts, and lawyers of recognized 
competence.208 After the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, criminal law 
became European law and was constitutionalized at the supranational 
level.209 Probably EU criminal law will be limited to financial crimes and 
to cross-border crimes, although the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will 
also make it easier for accused criminals to be extradited from one 
country to another even for crimes defined purely under national laws.210 
After passage of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights also becomes legally binding.211 The Lisbon Treaty also states that 
the European Convention on Human Rights becomes legally binding in 
the EU, meaning that national judges must consider the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights that sits in Strasbourg if they were not 
already doing so.212 Finally, the Lisbon Treaty also dropped the statement 
from the proposed Constitutional Treaty that EU law would be supreme. 
Instead, the Lisbon Treaty has a vague statement noting that under settled 
case law of the ECJ, the Treaties and European Law have primacy over 
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national laws.213 This complicated constitutional law situation has led 
two scholars to note, “EU law, national law, and the ECHR are 
conceived as the three sources of European constitutional pluralism.”214 
Whether national constitutions must yield to European law, as the ECJ 
has stated in various opinions, or whether they are a parallel source of 
law, remains an open question.215  
Although the ECJ has taken the position that European law is 
supreme216 and that both national law and national constitutions must 
yield to European law when there is a conflict,217 the constitutional courts 
of some of the member states have pushed back against this doctrine. 
The German Constitutional Court in a series of decisions has been an 
especially strong voice in this debate, stating that European law must 
protect fundamental rights as least as well as the German constitution 
does; if it does not then European law must yield to German national 
constitutional law, and that the national constitution remains the supreme 
law in Germany.218 The Italian Constitutional Court,219 the constitutional 
courts of Spain, Denmark, Poland,220 Hungary, and the courts of several 
of the Baltic States (Latvia and Lithuania especially)221 have taken 
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similar positions on the supremacy of national constitutions. On the other 
hand, the courts of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Estonia 
have stated that their national constitutions are inferior to European 
law.222 The English High Court has also acknowledged the primacy of 
EU law,223 and the House of Lords, when it was the supreme court in the 
U.K., acknowledged that English judges had the power to declare 
legislation to be in conflict with European law.224 The French high courts 
have come down on both sides of the debate, with the French 
constitutional court supporting the primacy of European law, while the 
Counseil d’Etat and the Cour de Cassation have argued in favor of the 
supremacy of the national constitution.225  
It is important to note that although various national constitutional 
courts have asserted the supremacy of their national constitutions over 
EU law, to date no national courts have directly defied a ruling of the 
ECJ. In fact, even the German Constitutional Court among others has 
made it very difficult for litigants to challenge European laws in the 
national courts.226 Thus, the national courts are protecting the uniformity 
of European law at the same time that they are asserting that their 
national constitutions are not inferior to it. As Jackson explains, 
“[n]ational courts have taken stances at once sympathetic to the 
development of a uniform and coherent body of EU law and maintaining 
distance—or the possibility of distance—between EU law and national 
constitutional law.”227 Some scholars therefore argue that while the 
national courts are protecting their power to interpret their national 
constitutions, they may also be forcing the judges on the ECJ to 
communicate more with them about the interpretation of European 
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law.228 Even after the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the controversy 
continued. In 2009, the German Constitutional Court in a case 
interpreting the Lisbon Treaty again stated its belief that it decides 
whether EU law is superior to the German Constitution.229 It is unclear 
whether other national courts will follow the latest German example.230 
Thus, the question arises, is European law hierarchical with the ECJ 
serving as the highest court in Europe, or is European constitutional law 
parallel to the national legal systems? Supporters of the former position 
tend to be labeled as European federalists, while the latter position has 
given rise to the concept popular in many European academic circles 
today known as “constitutional pluralism.” There are many definitions of 
constitutional pluralism. Providing one definition of constitutional 
pluralism, one pair of scholars has written, “[t]he language of 
constitutional pluralism is increasingly being used both to describe the 
existence of and the relationship between the many different kinds of 
normative authority—functional, regional, territorial and global—in the 
transnational context. It has particular traction, however, in relation to 
the European Union.”231 Probably the first definition of this concept 
comes from Neil MacCormick, who wrote, “[w]here there is a plurality 
of institutional normative orders, each with a functioning constitution . . . 
it is possible that each acknowledge the legitimacy of every other within 
its own sphere, while none asserts or acknowledges constitutional 
superiority over another.”232 In other words, MacCormick is noting that 
European constitutional law and national constitutional law are parallel 
and overlapping legal systems, not one single hierarchical one. Maduro 
uses a slightly different definition of constitutional pluralism:  
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Constitutional pluralism identifies the phenomenon of a plurality of 
constitutional sources and claims of final authority which create a 
context for potential constitutional conflicts that are not hierarchically 
regulated. More broadly, it refers to the expansion of relevant legal 
sources, the multiplication of competing legal sites and jurisdictional 
orders, and the existence of competing claims of final authority.233  
Jackson prefers to use the term “cooperative constitutionalism,” 
which she defines as “a notion of a pluralistic set of legal orders, 
conceived not hierarchically but in overlapping relationships.”234  
With so many scholars now proclaiming constitutional pluralism as 
their main academic approach to the study of European constitutional 
law, it should come as no surprise that the term is “underspecified” and 
implies a “multiplicity of meanings without offending any received 
understanding.”235 Constitutional pluralists within academia, however, all 
clearly seem to question the supremacy of EU law over national 
constitutions, leading some to use the term “primacy” instead of 
“supremacy” to refer to the ECJ doctrine. By some accounts, 
constitutional pluralism is so dominant among legal academics in Europe 
today that almost all scholars claim to be part of this intellectual 
movement.236 What do judges on the ECJ think about this academic 
debate? 
When I was in Luxembourg City, I asked staff members for the ECJ 
what the judges thought of this academic and judicial resistance to the 
supremacy of ECJ decisions. One staff member quickly explained the 
ECJ functions as a constitutional court for the European Union, and the 
Court must protect the fundamental rights of the European people.237 The 
implementation of ECJ decisions, however, is often left to judges on the 
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national courts. The staff member then exclaimed that European law is 
supreme, and any national laws or national constitutions in conflict with 
European law must yield. The staff member continued that the academic 
theories of constitutional pluralism had not entered into ECJ case law, 
and that the academic debate was not relevant to the work of the judges 
on the ECJ. The ECJ works under an assumption of the supremacy of 
European law over national law and national constitutions, and this issue 
has been settled for many years by previous ECJ rulings. This staff 
member concluded by noting that no national or constitutional court has 
ever refused to implement a decision of the ECJ, and even Germany 
changed its constitution when the ECJ ruled that a provision of the 
national constitution conflicted with European law. Thus, all the national 
judges have accepted the practical implementation of the supremacy of 
EU law. The staff member made it very clear that the judges on the ECJ 
work in the world of the practical and not in the area of theoretical 
academic debates.  
That brings us to the question, where is Finland in this academic 
debate? Finnish academics seem to be clearly supporters of the 
constitutional pluralism movement,238 but the position of Finnish judges 
is far less clear. In general, it seems that Finnish judges have tended to 
avoid the controversy as much as possible and have refused to take sides 
in the judicial debate. On the other hand, Ojanen states that the 
Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament takes a constitutional 
pluralism approach similar to the one espoused by the German 
Constitutional Court,239 but he agrees that Finnish judges do everything 
possible to avoid conflicts between domestic law and European law.240 
As one Finnish academic has noted, “[i]n Finland the idea of new 
European constitutionalism is a little-discussed issue. In general, the 
attitude to this phenomenon is more practical than theoretical.”241 When I 
asked Finnish judges and law professors about where Finland falls on the 
question of the supremacy of EU law, I got very vague answers in 
response. One judge did tell me that European law is considered part of 
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domestic law, with the same procedural safeguards for both.242 The judge 
went on to say that when Finland entered the EU in 1995, the principle of 
the supremacy of European law was already well established. But when 
asked what happens if the Finnish Constitution or other Finnish laws are 
in conflict with European law, the judge answered that that has not 
happened yet. The courts will do everything possible to interpret Finnish 
law so that it is not in conflict with European law, thus avoiding the 
controversies that other national courts have created regarding the 
supremacy of European law. As one judge explained to me, “Finnish 
courts have pushed an interpretative approach that attempts to always 
reconcile Finnish and European law, and avoid conflicts between the 
two.”243 Another judge told me that the Finnish courts will look at the 
practicalities of their decisions, avoiding conflicts with other courts 
including the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights whenever 
possible. As one Finnish law professor explained to me, “[u]nlike in 
Germany or in many of the newly independent states of Eastern Europe, 
given Finland’s history and tradition there is no need for confrontation 
with the ECJ in our courts.”244  
Professor Tuomas Ojanen agrees with this assessment. Ojanen has 
written that, in Finland, “[i]n practically all cases, it has been possible to 
implement EU law without having to limit the reasonable observance of 
constitutional rights.”245 He thus observes, “[t]here is no evidence of any 
reluctance on the part of the Finnish courts to embrace such fundamental 
qualities of EU law as its direct effect, indirect effect and primacy.”246 
Finally, it is worth noting that,  
A hard case that genuinely invites a Finnish court to ponder its 
acceptance of the primacy of EU law has yet to emerge. … The overall 
approach of the Finnish courts towards the application of EU law is 
characterized by pragmatism. Each case is dealt with individually, 
without expressing any general views about the status of EU law. One 
looks in vain, therefore, for the kind of bold and sweeping observations 
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on the relationship between EU law and national law that have been 
issued by certain English or German courts.247 
While Finnish judges do everything they can to avoid conflicts with 
EU law, they also do not send many preliminary reference cases to the 
ECJ. Sankari found that both Sweden and Finland were well below the 
average number of preliminary reference cases per country for the 1995-
2002 period.248 She theorizes that the long waiting periods for the 
national courts to receive an answer from the ECJ in preliminary 
references cases caused the Nordic courts to refuse to send preliminary 
reference cases to the ECJ.249 Stone Sweet’s research found similar low 
numbers of preliminary reference cases from Finland,250 and Ojanen 
notes that even today “the number of preliminary references is very 
modest.”251 When Finnish judges do send preliminary references cases to 
the ECJ, it is to get an interpretation of an EU law provision and not to 
make sure national legislation or constitutional law are in conformance 
with European law.252 Both litigators and judges have told me that the 
rate of reference cases is still very low in Finland. The judges on the 
Finnish supreme courts provided a different reason for this practice.253 
They uniformly said that the ECJ judges prefer that national judges 
refrain from sending them unnecessary preliminary reference cases 
because the workloads of judges on the ECJ are already too high. Thus, 
Finnish judges were being kind to their colleagues on the ECJ by 
refusing to send them too many preliminary reference cases. Several 
litigators I interviewed saw the situation quite differently. They said that 
many lower judges in Finland do not have a good understanding of 
European law, in part because many of the lower court judges do not 
have good foreign language skills. The judges on the Supreme 
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Administrative Court and the Supreme Court refuted this notion, stating 
that when in doubt it is the duty of lower court judges to send the cases to 
their respective supreme courts, and the high courts should decide when 
to send a preliminary reference case to the ECJ. But judges on the 
Finnish supreme courts very rarely do so, preferring to find a pragmatic 
answer on their own without resorting to the preliminary reference 
procedures. 
VI. ARE FINNISH JUDGES PART OF A EUROPEAN NETWORK OF JUDGES? 
I wanted to know more about Finnish judicial culture and the self-
identity of judges in Finland. This inquiry is part of the American 
judicial politics and institutional analysis I bring to this project. Bell 
argues that one must study the culture of the judiciary from three 
perspectives:  
The personal perspective looks at the way individuals perceive their 
role and career. The institutional perspective looks at the judiciary as a 
collective and examines the way in which the structures of the career 
and organi[z]ation of judges, as well legal process, affect the judiciary 
as a social institutional. The external perspective looks at the judiciary 
from the perspective of its impact on the wider world.254  
I wanted to gain more insights on all three perspectives. Part of a 
judicial politics analysis looks at role theory to see how it can help us 
understand judicial culture. In its most simple form, role theory asks 
whether the same individual would make different decisions if they were 
a legislator instead of a judge.255 Bell notes that, “[t]he law is something 
more than simply a system of rules or legal standards. Those rules 
operate in a context of institutions, professions and values that form 
together ‘a legal culture.’”256 In other words, how do Finnish judges 
understand their judicial roles and their judicial identities? 
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For a long time, Finnish judges have been accustomed to using 
multiple sources of law in their work and to following the precedents of 
the two supreme courts of Finland. After Finland became subject to 
European law in 1995, ECJ decisions became a more important source of 
law in Finland.257 At about the same time, Finland incorporated the 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights into its national law. 
As Ojanen notes, “EU membership has—together with the European 
Convention on Human Rights—contributed to the evolving significance 
of case law as a source of law in Finland.”258 Finland also works under 
the concept that “the judges know the law,” as many of my interviewees 
explained, so even if the lawyers in a case do not raise the appropriate 
questions of precedent or of European law, the judges are supposed to 
consider the relevant case law on their own.259 Thus, it should not have 
been too difficult for Finnish judges to add the decisions of the ECJ and 
the European Court of Human Rights to their judicial decision-making 
process. But are Finnish judges aware of this new case law? 
One of the questions that I asked most of my interviewees involved 
how judges in Finland get an understanding of European law. Although 
Finnish judges have long been accustomed in their work to consulting 
multiple sources of law, how familiar are they with the decisions of the 
ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights? How do Finnish judges 
use these cases? How much training do Finnish judges get in European 
law and especially European case law? As Cichowski notes, “[t]raining 
in EU law varies substantially amongst member state countries, and thus 
we might expect this factor to influence not only the availability of 
lawyers to assist claimants but also how knowledgeable and thus 
favorable national judges are to these claims.”260 I wanted to know where 
Finnish judges fall on this measure.  
Many of my interviewees commented on the generational differences 
in the familiarity of Finnish judges and lawyers with European law 
perspectives. Older judges and lawyers in Finland (and their law 
professors) did not study European law at university if they attended law 
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school before 1995. The younger generation, of course, has been 
required to study European law in law school since Finland joined the 
EU, and one of the law professors I interviewed told me, at the nation’s 
premier law school at the University of Helsinki, today over 40% of law 
students now study abroad, often taking European law courses in other 
European countries.261 Another of the Finish law professors I interviewed 
confirmed this phenomenon, stating that in her classes on European law, 
the students are mostly foreign nationals who spend a semester or a year 
studying in Finland because Finnish students do the same thing in 
reverse.262 Thus, younger lawyers, judges, and law professors in Finland 
have strong training in European case law and are quite willing to apply 
EU and ECHR law to their cases. Older legal professionals are less 
familiar with European law. The older generation, however, is 
approaching retirement age, so the generational training gap will 
eventually disappear. Yle News, the national news organization in 
Finland, reports that around one-third of the current judges in Finland 
will reach mandatory retirement age by 2020.263 These retirements will 
bring about the largest generational change on the bench in Finnish 
history.264 But the older generation remains somewhat unfamiliar with 
European law and especially European case law.  
In order to educate their colleagues on European law, several justices 
on the Supreme Court of Finland have created a monthly newsletter that 
summarizes in Finnish the most important decisions of the ECJ and of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The newsletter 
started in late 2007 or early 2008, according to one of the judges whom I 
interviewed.265 With the strong support of the President of the Supreme 
Court, this electronic newsletter is sent to all the judges on the regular 
courts in Finland. As my interviewees told me, in this way all the judges 
in Finland should be familiar with the main European law cases. The 
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judges in the administrative law system have a similar process. Recall 
that many estimate that around one-third of the cases before the Supreme 
Administrative Court involve European law issues.266  
I also wanted to try to understand more about Finnish judicial culture, 
and whether Finnish judges think of themselves as purely Finnish or as 
part of a larger global or at least European community of jurists. The 
evolution of the European Union has created a new European identity 
and a new concept of European citizenship, in addition to the pre-
existing national identities and national citizenship.267 Does this 
European identity carry over to the judges on the national courts? 
Slaughter refers to the European Union as a “community of courts” and 
by definition a community of judges.268 Bell also argues that a notion of 
“judicial community” is essential for institutional analysis of the 
judiciary.269 He also stresses the importance of judicial socialization. He 
writes, “[i]n studying the institution of the judiciary, it is necessary to 
look first within the judicial community. That community sets standards 
for judicial activity and inducts new judges into their role. It is the most 
immediate influence in defining what it is to be a judge.”270 I wanted to 
know if Finnish judges were part of this pan-European cultural 
phenomenon.  
The responses from my interviewees were quite interesting. Some 
said that lower court judges, especially on the regular courts, understood 
their identity as purely Finnish, while judges on the two supreme courts 
often took a more global and European perspective.271 Some said that the 
judges in the administrative courts system tended to be more 
academically oriented than judges in the regular courts, thus giving them 
a more cosmopolitan judicial identity. They travel more than the judges 
on the lower regular courts; more of them have Ph.D.’s in law, and they 
speak more foreign languages than their colleagues on the lower regular 
courts. As one of the judges whom I interviewed told me, some of the 
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judges on the regular courts choose that profession because they prefer a 
quiet life where they rarely have to leave their offices. They do not want 
to travel or interact with judges from other European nations. One 
litigator told me that he thought that judges in the Finnish regular courts 
prefer to remain isolated from what is going on elsewhere in Europe.  
On the other hand, the members of the supreme courts of Finland are 
much more ambitious and worldly in their views. Some judges in my 
interviews commented on the interactions they have with judges on the 
European courts, especially the Finnish judge on the ECJ who meets with 
members of the two supreme courts on a regular basis.272 They also meet 
with the Finnish judge on the European Court of Human Rights. Others 
pointed to generational differences discussed above. All of my 
interviewees agreed that Finland’s membership in the EU has 
empowered Finnish national judges in sometimes unexpected ways. One 
judge did tell me that, “European and Finnish judges see themselves 
today as part of a larger family of judges.”273 Thus, some judges in 
Finland have a more European identity, but others remain solely Finnish 
in their outlook.  
Formal and informal networks of judges can be very important in 
developing a broader judicial identity. These judicial networks are a 
relatively recent phenomenon, but a very important one. Judges naturally 
seek out the decisions of their colleagues on other similar courts because 
almost all judges share a common understanding of the judicial role. As 
two scholars have noted, “[j]udges create links between legal orders even 
in the absence of expressed norms of connections.”274 Baudenbacher has 
argued that there is an increasing dialogue among judges worldwide and 
among judges who must deal with similar legal issues. He notes,  
It is argued that in times of globalization, a global dialogue among 
supreme courts and international courts is necessary due to the 
homogenization of legal problems around the globe, the fact that 
human rights are by their very nature international, advances in 
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technology that make dialogue possible, and increased personal contact 
between the judges.275  
Some scholars have noted that the evolution of networks and linkages 
among judges was inevitable as more and more courts make their 
decisions available in widely spoken languages like English, and judges 
have the technology to access those rulings. As Slaughter has 
commented, “[j]udges around the world are talking to one another: 
exchanging opinions, meeting face to face in seminars and judicial 
organizations, and even negotiating with one another over the outcome 
of specific cases.”276 De Visser and Claes have done a fair amount of 
research on judicial networks in Europe. These scholars have thus 
observed that in transnational judicial communities, “judges are said to 
share common beliefs, values, and a self-perception and understanding of 
their role in the legal system and in society.”277  
The ECJ has been quite intentional in creating judicial networks 
among judges from all the EU member states. One of my interviewees 
noted that the ECJ has established networks for the presidents of all 
national supreme courts in Europe, as well networks based on subject 
matter for lower court judges like the one on environmental law.278 There 
is a newly established network for appeals judges from throughout 
Europe, as well as new networks for law clerks on the various national 
courts. Goldstein points out that the ECJ has invited many national 
judges to Luxembourg for social and educational events that increase 
knowledge and probable support for the ECJ, as well as creating new 
professorships financed by the EU in European law at various 
universities throughout Europe.279 My interviewees told me that Finnish 
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judges are involved in a large variety of formal and informal judicial 
networks.280 Judges on the Nordic supreme courts met on a regular basis 
long before Sweden and Finland joined the EU. Judges from the various 
supreme courts in the Nordic countries still meet on a regular basis, and 
Finnish judges also participate in broader European meetings of judges 
each year. Finnish judges often attend seminars abroad, and foreign 
judges are often invited to Finland. The European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg also hosts a variety of conferences and seminars for 
national judges. In this way, Finnish judges learn more about how other 
judges in Europe do their jobs, and they gain a greater appreciation for 
European law at the same time. These cross-border judicial interactions 
are strongly encouraged by most members of the supreme courts of 
Finland, including the two presidents of the courts. Some Finnish judges 
remain reluctant to reach out to their colleagues across Europe, but this 
sense of isolation is changing as the older generation retires from office.  
Another key to increasing the support for and understanding of the 
ECJ and other European courts is the fact that judges on the ECJ have 
relatively short terms. Although they may be reappointed to their seats on 
the bench, they often serve for only a few years and then return to their 
native countries. For example, a former Finnish judge on the ECJ 
returned to his position on the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland 
after finishing his term in Luxembourg.281 As Goldstein argues,  
The role of fixed terms has had an additional important [payoff] in 
fostering member-state acceptance of European jurisprudence. Both the 
judges of the ECJ and its Advocates General . . . at the end of their 
tenure return, newly socialized by service on the European Court, to 
their home countries where . . . they hold important governmental 
posts, or teach in prestigious law schools, spreading the pro-European 
law message.282  
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Several of my interviewees commented on how much they learn from 
talking to Finnish judges who have served on various European courts. 
Several of the current judges on the two supreme courts in Finland have 
worked in Luxembourg City or in Strasbourg as staff members for the 
European courts.283 They continue to share their experiences with their 
Finnish colleagues, thus spreading the pro-European message. 
CONCLUSION 
Judges in Finland continue to adapt to Finland’s membership in the 
European Union. On the one hand, being faced with learning European 
law came as a shock to Finnish judges and lawyers. On the other hand, 
the Finnish pragmatism has not been changed by requiring judges to 
consult case law from new sources such as the ECJ and the European 
Court of Human Rights. The new Constitution of Finland does require 
that judges protect human rights as one of their highest priorities, and 
European law is one avenue for doing so. Being a part of the EU has 
increased the power of the judges in both the regular courts and 
administrative court systems, and the new Constitution of Finland has 
given the courts a limited power of post-enactment judicial review. But 
the Finnish judges are reluctant to use their new power, and they 
certainly do not want to challenge the Parliament or the established 
political order in Finland.  
Finnish judges are becoming more and more familiar with European 
law, and this situation will continue to improve as the older generation of 
judges retires from the bench. The supreme courts are doing many things 
to increase the understanding of European law among their colleagues, 
including writing newsletters summarizing the most important recent 
cases and encouraging their colleagues to interact with other European 
colleagues through both formal and informal judicial networks. Finnish 
law students, at least at the top law school in the country at the 
University of Helsinki, demonstrate their interest in European law and a 
European identity because they study abroad in such large numbers. 
Certainly some judges in Finland remain reluctant to interact with their 
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European colleagues, to read case law from other countries, and in 
general to learn more about European law, but the number of judges in 
this category seems to be decreasing as time passes.  
Finnish judges do participate in many dialogues with their colleagues 
on the ECJ and on the European Court of Human Rights. It is very 
important that Finnish judges who serve on any of the supranational 
courts usually return to Finland and rejoin their previous colleagues on 
the national bench. Yet for a variety of reasons, Finnish judges send very 
few preliminary references cases to the ECJ. Finnish judges also do not 
want to participate in the judicial and academic debate over 
constitutional pluralism, partly because Finnish judges approach their 
role by pragmatically deciding only the narrow case before them and by 
avoiding grand judicial pronouncements. Finnish judges, like the rest of 
Finnish culture, have a very strong independent streak, but the judiciary 
in Finland also seems to like working in obscurity. Judges want to do 
their jobs without calling attention to themselves or to the courts as a 
whole. The Finnish legalist culture seems to demand that they act in this 
way. 
It is clear, however, that the changes brought about by Finland’s 
membership in the European Union can never be reversed. Finland has 
always had a western-looking, European style judiciary modeled on the 
processes and procedures used most often by its Nordic and perhaps 
Germanic neighbors. Now since Finland is part of Europe, politically, 
socially, and legally, many judges are developing a new sense of a 
European judicial identity. This evolving new judicial culture also means 
that eventually Finnish judges may be forced to make political decisions 
including overturning acts of Parliament because they do not sufficiently 
protect human rights or because they violate European law. Despite the 
long-standing tradition in Finland of the clear separation of law and 
politics, this dichotomy seems to be breaking down. As one scholar has 
written, in Finland, “[i]n general, European integration and European 
human rights with the supreme judicial organs have changed the 
relationship between law and politics so that these two cannot be clearly 
separated anymore, not even in doctrine.”284 Thus, Finnish judges 
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probably will eventually combine law and politics, but probably not in 
the way their American colleagues have done so. 
 
